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ABSTRACT
The long and lucrative history of smuggling in the early modern era linked New 
World econom ies in defiance of imperial m andates. As British m erchants gained 
increased legal and illegal access  to Spanish American ports, Bourbon reformers 
adopted the anachronistic policy of coastal defense via privateering. My work 
ad d resses  the history of Bourbon-era privateers and their role in the outbreak of 
the War of Jenkins’ Ear. By reading British accounts of the supposed brutality 
they encountered at the hands of Spanish privateers against a  tradition of 
Caribbean maritime depredations and widespread smuggling, my work 
illuminates the ways in which these  high se a s  encounters challenged British 
naval suprem acy and dem onstrated the changing nature of Bourbon policy in the 
eighteenth century.
Inter-imperial commercial relations between the Spanish and British in the 
Americas brought together a  diverse group of actors who defied the mercantilist 
ambitions of their respective monarchies. Spanish colonial residents, due to the 
erratic arrival of the galleon fleet in the eighteenth century, depended upon 
predominantly Jam aican m erchants for the most basic necessities. For their part, 
Jam aican interlopers used  the licit slave trade of the asiento contract in order to 
flood the Spanish port cities with British manufactured goods, thereby stimulating 
the economy of their own island. My thesis explores the nature of the contraband 
trade in an effort to dem onstrate its necessity to the commercial survival of 
various Spanish and British American peripheries.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements ii
Dedications iii
Section 1 .Virtue in Corruption 1
Section 2 .Interpretation of Illicit Trade in the Caribbean 4
Section 3.The Case of Cartagena 10
Section 4 .Commercial Invasion and the Guarda Costas 15
Section 5.The International Role of the Guarda Costas 23
Section 6.The Royal Navy and the Commercial Proxy War 28
Section 7.The Siege of Cartagena 41
Bibliography 47
i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This writer wishes to express her appreciation to Professor Brett Rushforth, 
whose careful editing and probing questions made this thesis better than I 
thought it could be. I would also like to thank Professor Paul Mapp for being 
patient through long conversations as  I tried to hammer out my argument as well 
as for his thought-provoking contributions to those conversations. My thanks also 
go to Professor Fabricio Prado, who pointed me towards the sources that have 
proven to be invaluable for my argument. I would also like to express my 
gratitude to Professor Matthew Mosca, who came in to assist with my thesis at 
the last minute and, despite that, provided careful editing and thoughtful critique.
Finally, I would like to thank all of the participants at my brown bag seminar who 
pushed me to be more clear in the organization and structure of my thesis. Elena 
Schneider at the Omihundro Institute has been extremely supportive over the 
past two years. Professor Karen Wulf, through a research seminar and her 
participation in my presentations of this work, has pushed me to sharpen my 
argument. Professor Guillaume Aubert provided valuable editing advice as  well 
as exciting avenues for future investigation. And, finally, I would like to thank my 
graduate cohort -  Cara Elliott, Hannah Bailey, Spencer Wells, and Katie Snyder 
-  for always being willing to read a draft and share a laugh. Graduate school is 
much easier when one is surrounded by such wonderful people.
This thesis is dedicated to Ben and Harry whose good humor and unflappable
support are my foundation.
Virtue in Corruption
Anchored near the channel of Bocachica, at the head of the largest amphibious 
force organized to date, Admiral Edward Vernon opened an intriguing letter.1 Smuggled 
out o f Cartagena de Indias’ jail by an escaped Turkish prisoner, the encrypted message 
gave detailed information about the city’s defenses gathered by British captives held 
there since the outbreak of the War o f Jenkins’ Ear. The captives assured Vernon that, 
“[tjhere is not half the difficulty that doth appear to you” in attacking the city.2 Both 
Vernon and the captives shared the widespread British belief that Spanish Americans’ 
waning loyalty to Madrid made them an easy target. The bustling Caribbean contraband 
trade carried on by British subjects in Spain’s colonies, in the minds of British observers, 
underscored the tenuous allegiance of Spanish Americans to their crown. A forest of 
foreign masts crowding the bay of Cartagena throughout the early decades of the 
eighteenth century further indicated to the British that the Spanish Empire was inept at 
controlling its subjects. Capitalizing on that perceived bureaucratic incompetence, 
Vernon’s siege o f Cartagena was seen as a formality to break open a Spanish American 
port which, economically at least, was already assumed to be under British control.
As cannon fire echoed through the streets of Cartagena at the beginning of the 
siege in 1741, Vernon’s informers would have eagerly awaited a prompt victory and their 
release. The Admiral and his invasion force, however, “Gott more blows than Honour” 
during the ordeal.3 Spanish American defenders, the same who the British assumed 
would defect to their side, killed 643 of the British invaders who attempted to take the
1 Richard Harding, Amphibious Warfare in the Eighteenth Century: The British Expedition to the West 
Indies 1740-1742 (Rochester. NY 1991).
'  Petition to Vernon from the English Prisoners in Cartagena (Copy) [April/May 1741] in Ranft, The 
Vernon Papers, p. 235. (Harding 1991) (Ranft 1958)
3 Diary of Captain Benjamin Norton, Saturday, June 20, 1741 in (Jameson 1923), ed., Privateering and  
Piracy in the Colonial Period: Illustrative Documents (New York, NY 1923): 387.
Fort of St. Lazar.4 Vernon’s inglorious defeat at Cartagena proved to be one o f the more 
embarrassing for the British during the War of Jenkins’ Ear. The war itself was fought 
largely for commercial reasons, sparked by British public outrage at the aggressive 
seizures of Anglo-American vessels accused of smuggling by Spanish American guarda 
costas patrolling the Caribbean.5 This same pre-war violence between British merchants 
and guarda costas that brought Vernon to Cartagena in the first place should have 
dissuaded him from any notion of a painless victory. However, as Vernon would discover 
too late to salvage his invasion attempt, smuggling in Cartagena provided the city a 
means of defense rather than the seeds of its supposed disloyalty to the Spanish crown. 
Blindness to the benefits of contraband and the violent responses of Spanish American 
corsairs proved disastrous for British officials at Cartagena.
Vernon’s invasion attempt was informed by a widespread belief among the 
British that smuggling and imperial loyalty were mutually exclusive. Observers described 
the trade through terms like vice, corruption, and degeneracy and historians have 
followed the language of these sources in condemning Spanish American officials who 
participated in the trade as self-serving and disloyal.6 However, this interpretation does
4 Ranft, The Vernon Papers, p. 17.
5 Guarda Costas were privateering vessels outfitted in Spanish American port cities to combat the 
widespread contraband trade.
6 Some of the eighteenth-century sources condemning Spanish American officials’ participation in
contraband trade as corruption are: Jose del Campillo y Cossio, Nuevo sistema de gobierno economica para 
la america (Universidad de los Andes, Merida, Venezuela, 1971, 1789); Jorge Juan, Antonio de Ulloa, and 
David Barry, Noticias Secretas De America (Londres: en la imprenta de R. Taylor, 1826); and Antonio 
Julian, S.J., La Perla de la America, Provincia de Santa Marta (Edicion facsimilar) (Academia 
Colombiana de Historia, Bogota, 1980, 1787). For some examples of contemporary histories that repeat 
this kind of vocabulary, see: Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein. Silver, Trade, and War: Spain and 
America in the Making o f  Early Modern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2000):
Hector R. Feliciano Ramos, El Contrabando ingles en el Caribe y el Golfo de Mexico, 1748-1778 (Sevilla, 
1990); J.H. Elliott, Empires o f  the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830 (Yale 
University Press, 2006); Lance Grahn, The Political Economy o f  Smuggling: Regional Economies in Early 
Bourbon New Granada (Westview Press, Oxford, 1997); and Colin Palmer, Human Cargoes: The British 
Slave Trade to Spanish America, 1700-1739 (University of Illinois Press, 1981).
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not sufficiently explain the repulsion o f Vernon’s invasion or the daily violence 
surrounding the contraband trade. (This article will argue that) The situation that Vernon 
encountered on the ground in Cartagena reflected the fact that certain kinds of contraband 
proved essential to the functioning of Spanish American economies and received the tacit 
approval o f metropolitan officials. The War of Jenkins’ Ear, although waged between 
Britain and Spain over issues related to illicit trade, could not have been fought in 
peripheral regions like Cartagena without those illegal supply chains. Further, emphasis 
on the corrupting influence of contraband trade is too simplistic. Cartagena’s political 
economy functioned in a vicious cycle: Jamaican interlopers supplied the Spanish guarda 
costa vessels that perpetrated the violence against British shipping that brought the two 
crowns to war, thereby increasing Cartagena’s demand for illicit goods. Contraband trade 
was not peripheral to this world or, as one scholar describes smuggling, “outside both the 
ideological and the pragmatic reach of imperial officials.”7 The function of contraband 
goods in the build-up to Vernon’s siege of Cartagena illuminates the internal logic of 
smuggling that provided for the city’s protection while simultaneously creating the need 
for more defense.
Vernon’s miscalculation of the strength and flexibility of Spain’s American 
empire proved costly. Yet, focusing just on Vernon’s failure at Cartagena ignores his own 
complicated relationship with smuggling. Following a tradition of illicit trade in the 
British Royal Navy, Vernon carried contraband goods with as much ease as he carried 
out official orders and, often, doing one required the other.8 Just as Vernon relied on
7 Cathy Matson, “Imperial Political Economy: An Ideological Debate and Shifting Practices,” in William 
and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 69, no. 1 (Jan. 2012): 40.
s See: N.A.M. Rodger, The Command o f  the Ocean: A Naval History o f  Britain, 1649-1815 (W.W. Norton
& Company, New York 2004):234-5.
3
smuggling to supply his crew for attacking Spanish territories, Spanish American 
officials in Cartagena also made pragmatic choices in the face of constricted options. 
Assigned the unenviable task of defending the port city from British commercial invasion 
despite a lack of supplies from legal channels, port official Gabriel de Mendinueta 
engaged in illicit trade in order to equip the naval vessels charged with harassing British 
smugglers. Instead of contradicting Spain’s imperial goals, Mendinueta and the guarda 
costas served the global interests of metropolitan planners like Jose Patino. The choices 
made by men like Vernon and Mendinueta illuminate the tensions and desires in 
Cartagena, Madrid, Kingston, and London that created the cycles of contraband and 
violence that erupted into the War o f Jenkins’ Ear and continued long after.
Interpretations of Illicit Trade in the Caribbean
In imperial communications throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
British and Spanish colonial officials interpreted the rampant contraband trade carried on 
in Spain’s American dominions as a sign o f locals’ greed. Many in the Spanish Empire 
saw contraband trade as a structural problem that stemmed in large part from the 
corruption of colonial authorities in American port cities. Two officials described the 
“vicious illicit commerce,” around Cartagena as a “deeply embedded system,” that 
flourished due to the “the misguided behavior of those who govern,” who they saw as 
“openly greedy and self-seeking at the expense of others.”9 For others, the sheer size of 
the problem made finding a solution seem insurmountable. According to a viceroy of 
New Granada in the 1740s, the crown could not “completely castigate this pernicious 
trade” without “five hundred thousand men to guard those coasts and to guard the guards 
9 Ibid., p.242.
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after them,” who “succumb[ed] to bribery.” 10 General opinion seemed to discount the 
idea that more soldiers could change the climate of corruption in Cartagena. Foreign 
merchants were described as unloading goods “at whatever time o f the day or night, and 
go through with them to the streets of this city” with total impunity.11 This description 
matched the words of the British Rear Admiral Charles Stewart in 1731 when he wrote
1 7that, “Villainy is inherent to this climate.” “ Antonio Julian, a priest who resided in New 
Granada, foresaw the fatal weakening of the empire if steps were not taken to address the 
smuggling trade. In Julian’s words “if the foreigners carry away the blood o f the New 
Kingdom, it remains underfed and the Monarchy loses little by little its vigor and 
substance.” 13 Imperial advisors also warned that contraband trade weakened the state’s 
fiscal health because the goods consumed in the American colonies were of foreign 
origin. According to a close minister of Philip V, “We have the most abundant markets 
in the world without leaving the dominions of the King; but they serve us little, as twenty 
percent o f what is consumed in the Indies is a product of Spain.” 14 Spanish imperial 
agents on both sides of the Atlantic spoke in unison when they disparaged the rampant 
contraband trade with foreigners that occurred in the king’s American territories. And, in 
each case, the loudest chorus of voices was reserved for vilifying the local officials who 
allowed the trade to continue.
10 Gabriel Giraldo Jaramillo, Relaciones de Mando de los Virreyes de la Nueva Granada (Publicaciones del 
Banco de la Republica, Bogota, Colombia 1954): 42. (Translation is my own.)
11 Archivo General de Indias, Santa Fe 1233, Letter from Juan Pablo de Ibarra to the King, August 1727 -  
translation is my own
12 Quoted in, N.A.M. Rodger, The Command o f  the Ocean: A Naval History o f  Britain, 1649-1815 (W.W. 
Norton & Company, New York, NY 2004): 235.
13 Antonio Julian, S.J. La Perla de la America, Provincia de Santa Marta (Edicion facsim ilar) (Academia 
Colombiana de Historia, Bogota, 1980), p.256. (Translation is my own.)
14 Jose del Campillo y Cossfo, Nuevo sistema de gobierno economic para la america (Universidad de los 
Andes, Merida, Venezuela, 1971): 70.
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Many observers outside of the Spanish empire saw the widespread illicit trade in 
the American colonies as symptomatic o f Spain’s declining power, a decline that would 
lead to Spain’s loss of its American revenue. Even French imperial circles discussed the 
apparent weakness of Spain’s control over its American colonies, as when Michel-Jean 
Amelot lamented that “The riches o f Peru and Mexico. . .are almost lost to Spain,” in a 
correspondence with Louis XIV.15 The lawless character in the Americas seemed to 
indicate to Amelot that Spain’s American subjects were on the verge of violently shaking 
off imperial rule. Amelot wrote that, “Avarice and pillage are unpunished, fortresses and 
garrisons are neglected; all things seem to portend a fatal revolution.”16 Spanish 
America’s apparent moral laxity with regard to the contraband trade played into the 
pervasive myth o f Spain’s ailing imperial health by the eighteenth century.17 Throughout 
official British correspondence and in newspapers bellicose rhetoric regarding Spanish 
weakness was oft-repeated. Many pointed to the ease with which a war between the two 
would tip in Britain’s favor, stating that, “If the Spaniards should bring us to the necessity 
o f getting upon a W ar.. .it will be carry’d on with such Force and Vigour, as will soon 
reduce them to Reason.” 18 The supposed prevalence of venal and corrupt officials in 
Spanish America indicated to Spain’s rivals that the empire was little more than a house 
of cards, ready to tumble with the slightest disturbance. Spain’s failure to supply its 
colonies also added weight to the assumption outside of the Iberian Peninsula that 
Spanish Americans would flock to a foreign banner if given the opportunity.
15 John Lynch, Bourbon Spain: 1700-1808 (Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass. 1989): 59.
16 Ibid., p. 59.
17 For a discussion of this myth, see: Frank Jay Moreno, “The Spanish Colonial System: A Functional 
Approach,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 20, N. 2, (Jun. 1967), pp. 308-320; Alejandro Caneque, The 
K ing’s Living Image: The Culture and Politics o f  Viceregal Power in Colonial Mexico (Routledge, New 
York, 2004); and Paul W. Mapp, The Elusive West and the Contest fo r  Empire, 1713-1763 (Chapel Hill,
NC 2011).
18 American Weekly Mercury\  August 7, 1729, issue 500, p. 3.
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While Spanish commentators seemingly condemned local officials and worried 
about the future of their empire, their British counterparts praised the possibilities for 
wealth generated by the contraband trade. The majority of British interlopers in the 
Caribbean called Jamaica home, and their proximity to the Spanish Main provided a boon 
to the island’s economy. As Jamaican resident Richard Harley explained, “ [t]he Trade 
with the Spaniards from Jamaica (tho’ Collusive) has been very considerable,” and that 
“there has been received from them in Gold and Silver and the Produce of New Spain, 
200,000 /. or 250,000 /. Yearly.” 19 A more conservative estimate than Harley’s may have 
been closer to the truth, such as that proposed by Jamaican Governor Nicholas Lawes, 
who stated that “[t]he private trade use to bring into England between 2 and £3,000 a year 
in ps. 8/8 silver, and gold.”20 Regardless of the figures, the island of Jamaica was an 
important staging ground for the commercial invasion of Spanish America. According to 
an early governor of Jamaica, possession of the island by the British effectively meant 
that they would “become the masters of the mines of Mexico and Peru” by syphoning off 
precious metals through contraband.21 In fact, by the mid-1730s, some in Parliament 
thought that the contraband trade between Jamaica and the Spanish Main was so well 
established that the trade’s legality might have been hazy to those on the ground. In one 
debate, Sir William Yonge reasoned that Jamaicans “might be concerned in a contraband 
trade in America, without themselves knowing that it was contraband.” For Yonge and 
other members of Parliament, smuggling had become so common for British American 
merchants that “many among them think they have as good a right to trade with the
19 Elizabeth Donnan, Documents Illustrative o f  the History o f  the Slave Trade to America (Carnegie 
Institute of W ashington, 1931), p .151.
2()CSP, no. 272 (1717-18): 175.
21 Great Britain, Public Record Office, Calendar o f  State Papers, Colonial no. 97 (1696-1697): 179 
(hereafter cited as CSP).
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11Spanish as with our own settlements.” “ For British observers, Spain seemed incapable of 
a vigorous defense of its commercial interests in the Americas and British American 
interlopers took advantage of that fact, aided in large measure by the participation of 
local Spanish American officials.
Echoing the arguments of eighteenth-century Spanish imperial agents and their 
British counterparts, much of the historiography of Caribbean smuggling assigns blame 
to local Spanish American officials. In the words of one scholar, the port of Cartagena 
“was a hotbed o f illegal activity.”  ^ The large-scale smuggling witnessed by eighteenth- 
century observers depended on, as argued by another scholar, the “collaboration o f the 
royal officials” in Spanish America who were “frequently denounced.. .for venality and 
corruption.”24 Bribery serves as an explanation for some as to how so much contraband 
moved through Spanish American ports. According to historian J.H. Elliott, colonial 
officials like Mendinueta “would wink at this illicit trade once their palms had been 
greased.”25 Despite the attention given to smuggling, however, contraband trade remains 
seen as something carried on in the periphery and beyond the ability of imperial planners 
to prevent or curtail.26 Overall, this picture of the political economy of smuggling points 
to the easy illicit relationships carried on between subjects of different empires out of 
sight of their metropolitan superiors. In this system, the vast expanse of the Atlantic 
Ocean prevented imperial officials from reigning in their perfidious subjects who
22 A Collection o f  the Parliamentary Debates in England, from  the year M ,DD,LX VIII To the present time, 
vol. 16 (London, 1735): 53.
23 Lance Grahn, The Political Economy o f  Smuggling: Regional Economies in Early Bourbon New  
Granada (Westview Press, Oxford, 1997): 5.
"4 Colin Palmer, Human Cargoes: The British Slave Trade to Spanish America, 1700-1739 (University of 
Illinois Press. 1981): 88.
"5 J. H. Elliott, Empires o f  the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830 (Yale University 
Press, New Haven, Conn., 2006): 224.
~6 Cathy Matson, “Imperial Political Economy: An Ideological Debate and Shifting Practices,” in William 
and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 69, no. 1 (Jan. 2012): 40.
appeared to be more comfortable economic bedfellows with each other than with their 
own merchants. In the dominant historiographic narrative, corruption as a result of 
disloyalty served as the driving force in the Caribbean economy, resulting in the image of 
a weak Spanish crown unable to control or protect its American possessions.
Corruption in eighteenth-century Spanish America, however, must be understood 
in light of the proscriptive nature of Iberian law. In fact, in much of the early modem 
world, law and practice did not match up, but such discrepancies were not indicative of 
rampant corruption. As historian Frank Jay Moreno lucidly explains, Spanish law 
frequently outlined humanistic and idealistic contours of proper behavior with the tacit
">7understanding that such laws would, of necessity, be broken." Furthermore, the issue of 
corruption becomes difficult to define in the Spanish American world, where the 
structure and dissemination of authority depended on ties of patronage that connected the 
king to his subjects across the ocean. As historian Alejandro Caneque argues, the Spanish 
imperial system was one of an “economy of favor” in which agents of the empire 
routinely used client-patron incentives, like bribery, to cement allegiance to a distant 
king.28 In this sense, corruption occurred only when agents of the Spanish king acted 
against the king’s interests in pursuit of their own enrichment. It was, in fact, this 
“network o f personal relations,” according to historian Zacarias Moutoukias, which 
“served to make the administrative structure more flexible,” and capable of assimilating
?9
political and economic challenges with a proscriptive and idealistic legal culture."
27 Frank Jay Moreno, “The Spanish Colonial System: A Functional Approach,” Western Political 
Quarterly, Vol.s 20, No. 2, Part 1 (Jun., 1967) pp. 308-320.
28 Alejandro Caneque, The K in g ’s Living Image: The Culture and Politics o f  Viceregal Power in Colonial 
Mexico (Routledge: New York, 2004): 174.
29 Zacarias Moutoukias, “Power, Corruption, and Commerce: The Making of Local Administrative 
Structure in Seventeenth-Century Buenos Aires,” Hispanic American Historical Review , Vol. 68, No. 4, 
(Nov., 1988), pp. 771-801: 776.
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“Corruption” in Spanish America, therefore, must be interpreted in accordance with 
colonial reality on the ground rather than through British misinterpretations or the 
proscriptive Spanish American legal culture.
The Case of Cartagena
Situated on the tropical lowlands of the Spanish Main, Cartagena de Indias 
overlooked one of the most famed bays in the Americas. Named for the equally as 
impressive harbor-city of Cartagena, Spain, Cartagena de Indias was constructed on a 
sandy island engulfed to its north by a wide bay and hemmed in on the south by a narrow 
slit of water. The bay of Cartagena was especially well-suited for harboring ships, as 
Spanish naval officials described, it “extends two leagues and a half from north to south; 
has a sufficient depth of water and good anchorage; and [is] so smooth, that the ships are 
no more agitated than on a river.”30 Situated on the brim of the Spanish Caribbean and 
within short sailing time to Porto Bello, Cartagena de Indias became the cornerstone of 
Spain’s transatlantic trade with the southern territories of Peru. The Spanish galleons 
dispatched for the trade fair at Porto Bello weighed anchor first at Cartagena and waited 
to receive word that the treasure ships of Peru had reached Panama. Once the 
announcement arrived that the silver-laden ships had landed, the Spanish galleons would 
leave their anchorage at Cartagena and sail to Porto Bello to start off the annual trade fair. 
At the conclusion of that fair, if everything went to imperial specifications, the fleet
31would once again return to Cartagena before making the voyage back to Spain.' In this
,0 Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, A Voyage to South America (London, 1772): 26.
31 Museo Naval de Madrid, No. inventario: 5279, Signatura: 4388, “Proyecto Para Galeones, Y Flotas, de 
el Peru, Y Nueva Espaha, Y Para Navios de Registro, Y Avisos Que Navegaron A Ambos R e v n o s Stein 
and Stein, Silver, Trade, and War, pp. 100-150.
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imperial scheme Cartagena de Indias proved important not for what it contributed to the 
trade fair but for the safe landing and refitting it provided the flota on both ends of its
voyage
Cartagena de Indias, AGI 1594
The sheer value of trade which anchored at Cartagena de Indias kept the port city 
in the forefront o f Spain’s strategic calculations in the Caribbean. One scholar estimates 
that during the middle decades of the eighteenth century, nearly 1,800,000 pesos of silver 
a year arrived at the port of Cartagena before being sailed back to Cadiz/ That silver 
from the mines of Potosf and the interior supplied the Spanish crown with the bullion it
32 Lance Grahn. The Political Economy o f  Smuggling: Regional Economies in Early Bourbon New  
Granada (Westview Press, Oxford, 1997), p. 18.
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needed to advance its European objectives in a century of near constant warfare. The 
successful seizure of the 1628 treasure fleet off the coast of Cuba by the Dutch privateer 
Piet Heyn, a bounty worth roughly 4.8 million silver pesos, justified the Spanish crown’s 
single-minded focus on the treasure fleet in the Caribbean.33 Possession of a port 
described at the time as admitting “only one ship at a time, and even she must be obliged 
to keep close to shore,” guaranteed that in at least one leg of the silver’s transatlantic 
voyage, metropolitan planners could be assured of its safety.34
The amount silver that passed through Cartagena de Indias each year inspired the 
envy o f Spain’s imperial rivals. Cartagena suffered successful sacks by Francis Drake in 
1586, Henry Morgan in 1668, and the French baron of Pointis, Bernard Louis Desjean in 
1697.35 Foreign aggression against the city meant that by the mid-eighteenth century 
providing for the city’s security became a major concern. According to official Spanish 
sources, “[t]he garrison in times of peace consisted] of ten companies of regulars, each 
containing, officers included, 77 men; besides several companies of militia.”36 The 
primary responsibility of Cartagena’s imperial officials was to prevent the 1628 Cuban 
disaster from reoccurring and guarantee safe anchorage to the galleon fleet. The territorial 
toeholds gained by Spain’s rivals in the Caribbean were initially intended as staging 
grounds for attacks on Spain’s lucrative trade with its American colonies. Surrounded by 
aggressive rivals at Jamaica, Curasao, and Martinique, Cartagena central to the safe 
passage of the galleon fleet.
33 Kris E. Lane, Pillaging the Empire: Piracy in the Americas: 1500-1750. (M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1998), pp. 
69-71.
34 Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, A Voyage to South America (London, 1772): 26.
35 Francisco Javier Membrillo Becerra, La Batalla de Cartagena de Indias (Publidisa, Madrid, Spain 2011):
24.
6 Juan and Ulloa, A Voyage to South Am erica , p. 23.
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Despite being well-defended and strategically important, Cartagena de Indias 
suffered along with the majority of Spanish America in the eighteenth-century from a 
lack of legal Spanish trade goods, leaving residents with few legal options for acquiring 
merchandise. As the president of the Audiencia de Santa Fe explained to the king, “the 
pitiful situation,” in New Granada was that “the land has so many riches and abundance 
[yet] where almost all o f the inhabitants and citizens are beggars.”37 Despite the 
tremendous wealth that passed through the port of Cartagena, the region itself remained 
trade-poor. Periods of time between flotas produced hardships for the residents and 
soldiers alike in Cartagena. According to visiting officers of the Spanish navy, the lengths 
of time without trade fairs “the inhabitants of Cartagena call tiempo muerto, the dead 
time; for, with regard to the trade carried on with the other governments [of the Spanish 
empire], it is not worth notice.”38 Through the stifling heat of Caribbean summers or 
entire years in which the flota  never came, metropolitan planners expected local officials 
to keep the port of Cartagena safe and clear but provided little by way of much-needed 
supplies.
The economic strain of Cartagena, moreover, was not particular to the eighteenth 
century. Even during the economic boom of the sixteenth century, Cartagena relied on 
outside funds for the maintenance of its port and garrisons. The placer mining which 
produced a flush of gold at Cartagena’s founding faltered in the later decades of the 
seventeenth century. What little gold enslaved Africans coaxed out o f the region’s 
tropical streambeds during the course of a century proved insufficient for the construction
37 Gabriel Giraldo Jaramillo, Relaciones de Mando de los Virreyes de la Nueva Granada (Publicaciones del 
Banco de la Republica, Bogota, Colombia 1954): 23. (Translation is my own.)
3H Juan and Ulloa, A Voyage to South America, p. 83.
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and maintenance of Cartagena’s military installations.39 Imperial planners used the 
situado, or treasury funds, from wealthier areas of Spanish America in order to pay for 
the defense of Cartagena’s port. Drawing the majority of its situado from Quito, 
Cartagena scrapped together enough wealth, as reported by Spanish officials, “for 
keeping up the fortifications, furnishing the artillery, and other expences, necessary for 
the defence of the place and its forts.”40 Spain diverted resources to the defense of 
Cartagena due to the port’s strategic importance in the imperial trade system.
Despite the primacy o f the city’s port, Cartagena’s hinterlands proved incapable 
of supporting the Tierra Firme fleets. Cartagena dealt with a very basic problem as a 
tropical outpost -  it was too hot to cultivate European staples. As one moves inland from 
New Granada’s hot and humid coastline, increased elevation and decreased temperatures 
yield to a landscape more favorable to wheat cultivation. Despite the relative proximity 
between the port and the highland city of Santa Fe de Bogota, however, wheat cost 2,000 
percent more in Cartagena than in the highlands where it was grown.41 The voyage from 
the tierra fri'a in the spine of the Andes to the tropical lowlands took four arduous 
months, during which time the wheat generally went bad if it arrived at all. Without a 
reliable domestic supply or legal imports of wheat, officials in Cartagena relied on 
foreign supplies. The proximity of Jamaica, moreover, plugged Cartagena into the 
provisions trade circuits of British North America.42
Anthony McFarlane. Colombia Before Independence: Economy, Society, and Politics Under Bourbon 
Rule (Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.8.
40 Juan and Ulloa, A Voyage to South Am erica , p. 84.
41 John R. Fisher, Allan J. Kuethe, and Anthony McFarlane, eds. Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New  
Granada and Peru (Baton Rouge, Louisiana 1990): 140.
42 Colin Palmer, Human Cargoes: The British Slave Trade to Spanish America, 1700-1739 (University of 
Illinois Press, 1981), p.61.
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Commercial Invasion and the Guarda costas
At the conclusion of the War of the Spanish Succession, Britain gained the 
exclusive right to carry slaves to Spain’s American colonies, known as the asiento 
contract. Starting in 1713, Queen Anne granted the privilege of conducting that trade to 
the newly formed South Sea Company. The island of Jamaica, positioned in the center of 
the Spanish Caribbean, was a suitable choice as a refreshment station for the South Sea 
Company’s trans-Atlantic slaving vessels. Initially both Barbados and Jamaica were used, 
by the mid-1720s, Jamaica eclipsed Barbados in importance due to the resources of the 
island and the volume of trade carried on there.43 The abundance of cattle and produce in 
the early decades of the eighteenth century, before more land on the island was dedicated 
to the production of sugar, meant that the factories there were well-stocked.44 South Sea 
Company agents recuperated and quarantined the enslaved Africans at Kingston after the 
horrors of the Middle Passage in an attempt to make them appear healthy before being 
shipped to their final destinations for sale.
Jamaica’s location appealed to more than just legal representatives of the South 
Sea Company and the convergence of trade goods intended for Spanish America on the 
island provided ample opportunity for smugglers. Private smugglers and Company ships 
encountered stiff competition for Spanish American trade among Britain’s Royal Navy. 
Upon taking his post as governor, Nicholas Lawes was appalled by the conduct of the 
Royal Navy stationed at Jamaica. Despite the nearly constant dangers of piracy and
43 Ibid., p.59.
44 Factories, in this sense, refer to the outposts established throughout the Atlantic World by slave trading 
companies where slaves were housed and fed after the Middle Passage and before their sale. The merchants 
who resided in these posts were referred to as factors and will be referred to as such.
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harassment by Spanish privateers, Lawes found the British ships assigned to the island 
absent. The very Navy vessels upon which Jamaicans depended for their security, the 
Winchelsea, the Ludlow Castle, and the Diamond, had sailed down to the Spanish Main 
days before, laden with contraband goods. Lawes’ rude awakening to the operations of 
the British Royal Navy in the Caribbean would not be the last of his short tenure, nor 
would the Navy’s dedication to smuggling ebb in the coming years.45 The participation of 
the Royal Navy in trade that Spanish imperial agents considered illicit indicates an 
organized and aggressive commercial pressure on the part of the British. This pressure is 
not adequately described by terms like “interloper” and “smuggler,” which denote a 
small-scale illegality rather than an institutionalized attempt to break open Spanish 
American ports on the part of the British Navy. The Royal Navy’s engagement in the 
contraband trade also escalated opportunities for violence between the two crowns in the 
waters of the Caribbean.
Spanish imperial planners confronted this veritable commercial invasion of the 
crown’s American possessions without a strong naval presence o f their own. As a result, 
Spain issued corsair patents to captains willing to defend Spanish American waters by 
searching and seizing smuggling vessels. Stemming from precedent set in the seventeenth 
century, Spain awarded successful seizures with a portion of the prize money to be 
adjudicated in local courts.46 Commercial incentives on both sides created flashpoints of 
violence across the Caribbean as guarda costas and British merchantmen encountered 
one another on the high seas. Most of these meetings met with “the usual Compliments of
45 Great Britain, Public Records Office, Calendar o f  State Papers, Colonial (1717-1718): 271 (hereafter 
cited as CSP).
46 Luis Navarro Garcia, Historia General de Espana y America: Tomo XI-1, Segunda Edicion (Ediciones 
Rialp, S.A., Madrid, Spain 1981 ):34.
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hanging, burning Matches between their Fingers, &c.”47 Spanish privateers were accused 
in the British American press of excessive violence, such as when a Boston merchant 
sloop was taken and, “in cold blood [they] cut the Master and all his Men to pieces, 
saving only the Cabbin-Boy.”48 The spread of guarda costas throughout Spanish 
American ports turned British contraband trading into a dangerous venture while the 
increased presence of ships of the British Royal Navy raised the stakes for Spanish 
privateers as well.
In this environment of simmering conflict, a British sloop weighed anchor in the 
bay of Cartagena de Indias in February of 1729. The sloop had sailed south from 
Jamaica, choosing to land at the well-fortified port instead of any other point along the 
1,500 leagues of relatively undefended coastline running from Caracas to Lima.49 The 
British vessel would have passed through the channel of Boca Chica, that straight so 
narrow that only one ship could sail through at a time. On the vessels’ left stood the fort 
of San Luis de Boca Chica, a fortification at the far end of Tierra Bomba, whose cannons 
sat poised for action as the Jamaican vessel sailed past.50 Once at the port, the Jamaican 
interloper unloaded two hundred barrels of flour in clear view of Mendinueta and other 
port officials.51 As with so many cases of foreign merchants unloading cargo in Spanish 
American port cities, this Jamaican interloper presumably paid a handsome bribe and 
profited from Mendinueta’s venality.
47 South Carolina Gazette, January 29, 1731-2, no. 4.
4X The Boston News-Letter, March 5, 1730, issue 166, p. 2.
49 Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa. Discourse and Political Reflections on the Kingdoms o f  Peru 
(University of Oklahoma Press, 1978), p.241.
^  For a description of the fortifications of Cartagena, see: Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, A Voyage to 
South America (London, 1772): pp. 26-30.
51 Archivo General de Indias, Santa Fe 1093, Don Gabriel de Mendinueta, Puerto de Cartagena 16 de 
febrero, 1729.
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And yet, Mendinueta addressed a letter to Phillip V in order to explain the 
entrance of the Jamaican’s contraband flour. While he remains silent as to whether or not 
his “palms were greased,” he makes clear that the barrels were intended for the Spanish 
American seamen who would risk their lives seeking out prizes and defending the 
crown’s commercial interests in the circum-Caribbean. Perhaps Mendineuta’s letter 
serves as a cover, artifice for his own involvement in a lucrative smuggling ring which 
supplied the residents of Cartagena rather than its hard-working naval crews. Such an 
accusation may be true and, as is common when observing illegal activity from a remove 
of several centuries, completely unverifiable. Mendinueta’s own promotion to captain of 
New Granada’s guarda costa squadron that same year indicates that at least someone 
considered his performance as port official commendable.52 Further, at no point were the 
guarda costas themselves a mere artifice for illegal activity, as more and more cases of 
violent maritime encounters in the Caribbean make clear.
The case of Mendinueta illustrates the countervailing pressures encountered by 
subjects of the Spanish crown in the Caribbean and the pragmatism required to deal with 
those pressures. While letters of patent for corsairs alleviated Spain’s pressing need for 
increased naval strength for a time, Spanish American corsairs in ports like Cartagena 
still required foodstuffs and naval stores to operate. In the near-century between the 
1670s and the 1760s only ten galleon fleets passed through the port of Cartagena — six 
between 1675 and 170053 and four between 1713 until 1763.54 Many of the intended 
voyages were prevented from embarking from Sevilla, and later Cadiz, due to the almost
52 Grahn, The Political Economy o f  Smuggling, p. 156.
53 Anthony McFarlane. Colombia Before Independence: Economy, Society, and Politics Under Bourbon 
Rule (Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.22.
34 Lance Grahn. The Political Economy o f  Smuggling: Regional Economies in Early Bourbon New 
Granada (Westview Press, Oxford, 1997), p.20.
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continuous state of war on the continent and in the sea lanes of the Caribbean. Still others 
were waylaid in Spanish American ports, unable to sell their merchandise due to the 
prevalence of contraband goods which flooded the otherwise empty markets. As a result 
port officials like Mendinueta used illicit trade in order to equip guarda costas.55 The 
presence of armed Royal Navy ships near Spanish American ports meant that the safety 
of the port depended on equipping Spanish American corsairs through any means 
necessary.
The calculation of supplying the guarda costas over prosecuting the contraband 
trade proved as much economic as it was strategic. Contraband trade may have 
challenged Spain’s claim to monopoly privileges over its American possessions, but such 
challenges mattered little when compared to the wealth brought into Spain through the 
galleon fleet. While Jamaican observers estimated the contraband trade with the Spanish 
Main yielded between £200,000 to £250,000 a year, the Spanish crown remained 
concerned with the much larger sums of Peruvian silver brought to the Iberian Peninsula 
each year.56 Assuming a consistent value of £196,000 as the value of Spanish American 
goods earned through illicit trade and multiplying that value by the thirty year period in 
which Britain held the asiento contract, Britain earned roughly 5.9 million pounds.57 On 
the other hand, even estimating that the galleon fleet only completed a successful voyage 
eight times in the same period with an average of 1,800,000 pesos onboard, Spain earned
55 N or was M endinueta’s case extraordinary in Spanish America, as historian Zacarias M outoukias’ work 
on the role o f illicit trade in the supplying o f Buenos Aires’ garrisons with monetary loans and supplies in 
the seventeenth-century makes clear. According to Moutoukias, in a comment that applies equally as well 
to Cartagena, “corruption was bom out o f the conditions in which the system was erected,” in, Moutoukias, 
“Power, Corruption, and Commerce,” p. 799.
36 Elizabeth Donnan, Documents Illustrative o f  the History o f  the Slave Trade to America (Carnegie 
Institute of W ashington, 1931), p. 151.
37 For the £196.000 value for 1715, see: Curtis P. Nettels, The Money Supply o f  the American Colonies 
before 1720 (Clifton, New Jersey 1973): 40.
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roughly 14.4 million pesos through its transatlantic trade. While the erratic arrival of 
the galleons to Cartagena during the eighteenth century proved insufficient to supply the 
port city, the value of those return shipments of silver far outweighed the value of the 
contraband trade. From the perspective of Spain’s imperial economy, therefore, 
Mendinueta’s primary responsibility lay with protecting the galleons rather than limiting 
foreign imports.
Furthermore, Mendinueta could not bar entrance to some foreign interlopers while 
admitting only those needed to supply the garrison and the guarda costas. According to 
Spanish naval officials, if Mendinueta chose to selectively prosecute some interlopers, 
then, “no other ship would enter their port.”59 While these same officials assumed that the 
lack of ships entering the port would upset local officials because it would mean the loss 
of their source of illicit income, perhaps there is a less cynical way of interpreting the 
apparent lack of action against foreign interlopers at Cartagena. If confiscation of one 
foreign vessel would frighten the others away from the port, Mendinueta would sacrifice 
his ability to provide for Cartagena’s coast guard defense by vigorously prosecuting the 
contraband trade. The loss of foreign trade would have left the garrisons of Cartagena 
without a sufficient supply of basic staples, further jeopardizing Mendinueta’s ability to 
defend the port. Within the framework of the larger Spanish political economy, the 
seizure of foreign vessels at the port of Cartagena would have caused more harm than 
benefit.60
58 Lance Grahn. The Political Economy o f Smuggling: Regional Economies in Early Bourbon New 
Granada (Westview Press, Oxford, 1997), p. 18.
39 Juan and Ulloa, Discourse and Political Reflections, p. 50.
60 The role o f contraband trade and its persecution on the ground in Cartagena affords another promising 
route of inquiry not taken in the current study. W hile personal profit motivated merchants to outfit guarda 
costas and competition between different political factions in Cartagena played a role in harassing British
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While the value of the fleets which passed through Cartagena proved exceptional, 
Mendinueta was not the only Spanish American officials who used illicit supply chains to 
defend Spanish possessions. According to historian Joyce Elizabeth Harmon, Manuel de 
Montiano, the governor of Florida, faced similar circumstances in the year before the 
outbreak of the War o f Jenkins’ Ear. In a letter sent to the governor of Cuba, Juan 
Francisco de Giiemes y Horcasitas, Montiano explained his own engagement in 
contraband trade with British North America. According to Montiano, a shipment of New 
York flour arrived at St. Augustine because he worried that the impending conflict and 
the increased violence in the waters of the Caribbean would cut off his peripheral port.61 
For that reason, Montiano engaged the easiest supply chain available to him. Giiemes y 
Horcasitas approved o f Montiano’s decision, which is telling considering the Cuban 
governor’s zealous support of the guarda costas on his own island. One of the guarda 
costas sponsored by Giiemes y Horcasitas, the Triunfo captained by Domingo Lopez de 
Aviles, captured ten British vessels in the year 1737 with the spirited support of the 
governor.62 Forced into situations in which the best defense of Spain’s American 
territories meant engaging in foreign commerce, both Giiemes y Horcasitas and Montiano 
acted in similar ways to Mendinueta.
shipping, this study focuses on contraband trade from the metropolitan perspective. For works that 
approach contraband trade through an analysis of the social stratification, merchant competition, and 
political factions, see: Cromwell, Jesse Levis. “Covert Commerce: A Social History of Contraband Trade in 
Venezuela, 1701-1789.” PhD diss., University o f  Texas at Austin, 2012; Prado, Fabricio Pereira, “Colonia 
do Sacramento: a situayo na fronteira platina no seculo XVIII,” Horizontes Antropologicos, Vol. 9, 1 
(2003): 79-104; and Moutoukias, Zacarias, “Power, Corruption, and Commerce: The Making o f  the Local 
Administrative Structure in Seventeenth-Century Buenos Aires,” Hispanic American Historical Review , 
Vol. 68, No. 4, (Nov., 1988): 771-801.
61 Joyce Elizabeth Harmon, Trade and Privateering in Spanish Florida: 1732-1763 (The St. Augustine 
Historical Society, St. Augustine, Florida, 1969): 21.
62 Levi Marrero, Cuba: Economfa y Sociedad: del monopolio hacia la libertad commercial (1701 -1763)(I) 
(Editorial Playor, Madrid, Espana 1978): 81.
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In the cases of Giiemes y Horcasitas, Montiano, and Mendinueta, engagement in 
or support of the contraband trade did not imply disloyalty but, rather, pragmatism. The 
ability of imperial agents to disregard elements of Spanish law, moreover, was legally 
institutionalized through appealing to the king. Each of these colonial agents invoked the 
logic of Spanish imperial law that the king, as the ultimate arbiter of justice, would 
approve of their actions if he were aware of the situation on the ground.63 While 
Mendinueta refrained from detailing his dependence on contraband trade to the king, he 
made clear that Cartagena lacked fundamental supplies that the British could provide. 
Mendinueta appealed to King Philip V that without the importation of Jamaican flour 
“we find it impossible to Continue in Cruising because the Royal Officials [in Cartagena] 
said there are absolutely no supplies to meet [a maritime force’s] most basic Needs.”64 In 
1731, moreover, Governor Antonio de Salas hinted at the longstanding supply chains 
running from Jamaica to Cartagena in a testimony to the crown. According to Salas, “a 
packetboat named Sara, her captain John Paris arrived from Jamaica carrying Goods and 
supplies for the Ships o f the Guardacostas.” Salas testified that the arrival o f goods from 
Jamaica under the commission of one Domingo Justiniani, resident of that island, was 
quite frequent.65 Taking Salas’s testimony, it is clear that Mendineuta’s lack o f supplies 
was met by the regular arrival of contraband goods from Jamaica. Illicit supply chains 
provided Mendinueta with the means necessary to accomplish his primary responsibility 
-  provide for the guarda costas and Cartagena’s defense.
63 For a discussion o f the legal concept o f  “se acata pero no se cumple,” or “I obey but do not comply,” see: 
Moreno, “The Spanish Colonial System: A Functional Approach,” p. 317-8.
64 Archivo General de Indias, Santa Fe 1093, Don Gabriel de Mendinueta, Puerto de Cartagena 16 de 
febrero. 1729.
63 Archivo General de Indias, Indiferente General 2809, Testimonio de Cartagena, 18 de diciembre, 1731.
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The International Role of the Guarda Costas
Mendinueta took his post in Cartagena during the tumultuous early decades of the 
eighteenth century as warfare ended in Europe and a new Spanish dynasty was crowned. 
The War of Spanish Succession gave Madrid the unprecedented opportunity to centralize 
authority over the country’s semi-autonomous provinces. Further, inheriting the 
reforming impulses of the reign of Charles II, the new Bourbon monarchy sat poised for 
greater control over and reform of the Indies trade. Yet, the new king suffered from his 
own paralyzing personal demons and became dependent on the strong-wili and force of 
character of his second wife, Elizabeth Famese.66 While Famese brought bright and able 
ministers into the highest echelons o f Spain’s government, her single-minded focus on 
obtaining Italian principalities for her sons hamstrung many initiatives that her ministers 
considered more important to Spain’s imperial health.67 One of the highly competent 
ministers who Famese brought to Spanish government, Jose Patino, took a special 
interest in foreign trade and Spanish American governance.
Patino showed a keen interest in the defense of Spain’s trade with the American 
colonies. He rose in the ranks of Spanish bureaucracy partially through his connections 
with the abbe Alberoni, an association which indebted him greatly to Alberoni’s patron, 
Elizabeth Famese.68 While not a reformer in the sense of the later Bourbon ministers, 
Patino instinctively recognized the need for Spain to exert a strong naval presence, 
especially in the face of British commercial aggressions in the Americas.69 Patino 
understood the abuses perpetrated by British merchants, insight he gained when he sent
66 For two lively accounts o f  Philip V ’s emotional and mental issues, see: John D. Bergamini, The Spanish 
Bourbons: The History o f  a Tenacious Dynasty (New York: Putnam, 1974); and Carlos Martinez Shaw and 
Marina Alfonso Mola, Felipe V (Madrid: Arlanza Ediciones, 2001).
67 See: John Lynch, Bourbon Spain: 1700-1808 (Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass. 1989): pp. 80-95.
John Lynch, Bourbon Spain: 1700-1808 (Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass. 1989): 84.
69 Stein and Stein, Silver, Trade, and War, p. 203.
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the naval officers with the French scientific expedition of La Condamine to report back to 
him on the state of the Indies.70 Patino also understood Spain’s relatively weak 
bargaining position coming out of a war with no significant naval power. The 
administrative rise of Patino worried some British observers. British ambassador 
Benjamin Keene lamented, “No one can be more certain than I am, that [Patino] is an 
enemy to all foreign commerce, and as he had more knowledge of trade and of the abuses 
in the customs than any minister had before him, he will make us more uneasy than any 
has yet done.”71 Famese’s patronage o f Patino, however, forced the minister to reorient 
his American designs around her Italian concerns, leading to a creative exploitation of 
American maritime violence for Spanish imperial gain in Italy.
In the decades following the War of the Spanish Succession, Spain had neither the 
finances nor political will for another continent-wide conflict, despite Famese’s 
aggressive posturing towards the Italian principalities of Tuscany and Parma. By 
deploying what one scholar has described as “the diplomacy of menace,” Patino coaxed 
Britain into the Treaty of Seville in which Britain promised to support Spain’s 
aggressions in Tuscany and Parma by promising to reign in the guarda costas J2 The 
threat of guarda costa violence played into Patino’s diplomatic arsenal because of the 
asiento contract.73 The lucrative trade contract meant that Patino could push his British 
counterparts further because a declaration of war would prove costly to Britain. The 
threat of financial loss allowed Patino to issue empty decrees in response to British
70 Ibid., p. 203.
71 Keene to Walpole, November 25, 1731 quoted in Lynch, Bourbon Spain, p. 146.
72 Lynch, Bourbon Spain, p. 136.
73 The asiento contract was the right to trade a specified number of slaves to Spanish America. The need for 
the contract began with the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1492 which divided the known world between Spain 
and Portugal, separating Spain from access to the African coast. From that moment forward, the Spanish 
empire depended on foreign importers to bring African slave labor to its colonies across the Atlantic.
Britain received the contract as a concession following the W ar of the Spanish Succession.
24
outrage without enacting concrete plans to curb the violent depredations of the guarda 
costas. In one such decree from 1732, “Governors are to understand, that they shall be 
answerable for the Violences which the said Cruizers shall commit.”74 In order to prevent 
violence and the seizure of unlawful prizes, the decree further recommended that, “before 
[governors] give them Commission to go to Sea, they ought to examine into the 
Characters of their Persons.”75 Yet, even Patino’s negotiating counterpart, Benjamin 
Keene, recognized that placing blame on Spanish American governors for guarda costas 
seizing unlawful prizes simply added to “la lenteur Espagnole,” with little restitution for 
British American seamen. Beyond adding delays to the process of adjudicating on prizes, 
Keene recognized “a share of malice” in Patino’s maneuvering, knowing that his well- 
worn sentiments of outrage at the utter lawlessness of the guarda costas belied little 
attempt to remedy that maritime violence.76
Spain’s relative lack o f naval power going into the eighteenth century meant that 
the success o f Patino’s policy also depended on the illicit trade.77 As the Daily Courant 
reported in 1726, “Don Joseph Patino is very busy in finding out Ways and Means for 
raising Money for the present Emergencies.” While the minister recognized the need for a 
more vigorous policing o f Spain’s American trade, he offered, “a high Interest to the 
monied Men here to advance Money; but the Securities for Repayment being precarious, 
and Money very scarce, his Propositions meet with many Difficulties.” Patino’s fiscal 
difficulties were further complicated by the demands of the Intendant of Marine, who 
needed, “Sixty six thousand Pieces of Eight from the Commerce there, for defraying . . .
74 American Weekly Mercury, April 20, 1732, issue 643, p. 3.
73 American Weekly Mercury, April 20, 1732, issue 643, p. 3.
16 Keene to Walpole, November 25, 1731 quoted in Lynch, Bourbon Spain, p. 146.
77 Henry Kamen, Spain, 1469-1714: A Society o f  Conflict (Harlow, United Kingdom, 2005): 274.
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the Charge of two Men of War, which are to go to cruise against the Interlopers upon the 
Coast of Cartagena.”78 While the cost o f two Men o f War strapped Spain’s already 
precarious budget, Patino would have understood the benefits of allowing privateers to 
patrol American waters. Avarice drove Spanish American seamen in pursuit of wealthy 
British prizes, relieving the state of the heavy burden of providing maritime defense.
With his knowledge of trade in the Indies, including the illegal aspects of it, Patino would 
have recognized that many of the naval stores and supplies which the guarda costas 
needed would arrive through illicit channels.79 Patino’s success, therefore, rested on his 
ability to use the contraband trade as an instrument of empire. By tapping into British 
trade networks for supplies, in many ways men like Mendinueta were accomplishing 
exactly what Patino wanted. Illegal from the point of view of the Spanish, these trade 
networks were nonetheless used as supply chains for the nascent Spanish naval presence 
in the Caribbean.
Despite the rag-tag nature of the Spanish guarda costas fleet, they proved 
remarkably successful at harassing British American shipping. Although their official 
mandate remained to protect Spain’s American possessions from illicit traders, their 
actions belied the larger purpose set out for them by Patino. British governors throughout 
the Americas lodged complaints similar to that of Governor Archibald Hamilton of 
Jamaica who wrote the Council of Trade and Plantations that guarda costas robbed 
British subjects with impunity throughout the Caribbean. According to Hamilton, many
78 Daily Courant (London, England), Thursday, October 27, 1726; Issue 7810, page 2. The “Emergency” 
which Patino faced in 1726, specifically involved the blockading of Cartagena by Vice-Admiral Francis 
Hosier as a result of anger over guarda costa seizures. See: Nowell, Charles E. “The Defense o f 
Cartagena,” The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 42, No. 4, 1962.
19 Juan and Ulloa, Discourse, pp. 45-50; Archivo General de Indias, Santa Fe 374, Letter from Jose Patino 
to the King, April 14, 1722.
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British ships were seized “for which no other pretence, has in some cases been found, 
then that some few Spanish pistolls or inconsiderable sums of coin’d silver . . .  has been 
found on board.” Worse still were the cases in which British vessels were seized and held 
under the mere suspicion of illegal trade.80 While claiming that seized British vessels 
were innocent of engaging in contraband trade may have served as cover for those 
vessels’ restitution, from the perspective of the Spanish political economy, such claims 
mattered little. If Patino wished to use the actions of the guarda costas to pressure Britain 
into supporting his patron’s Italian designs, then the ships proved more effective to him 
the more outrage they incurred among British merchants. Patino’s promises to curtail the 
cruising of guarda costas in American waters functioned to bring British officials to the 
negotiating table.
Much ink was spilled in the British American press regarding the violence 
perpetrated by the guarda costas throughout American waters. Readers of these 
newspapers encountered many examples of stories such as that which ran in Philadelphia 
on July 14, 1720. According to the article “ 18 Dead Bodies, appearing to be English 
Men, were found, drove on Shore,” off the coast o f Virginia. The paper reported the 
bodies to be the victims of a guarda costa commissioned out of St. Augustine. As if the 
shock of eighteen dead were not enough, the story went on to detail how the victims were 
“tied back to back,” with one gentleman “found with his hands tied behind him, and his
o  1
two great toes tied together.” Ostensibly, the victims were tied up in order to ensure 
their drowning when thrown into the Atlantic. Whether or not the unfortunate British 
subjects encountered a guarda costa or any number of stateless Caribbean pirates remains
XWCSP, 1716 p.203.
Xl American Weekly Mercury’, July 14, 1720, issue 30, p. 2.
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as inconclusive now as it would have been in 1720. The newspaper article does, however, 
demonstrate the kinds of violence which the British considered the guarda costas capable 
of committing.
While the guarda costas were blamed for some maritime violence with scant 
evidence, many more cases of bloodshed fell squarely on their shoulders. In 1731, for 
example, a British Royal Navy vessel, the Spence, “had taken a Spanish Guard la Costa; 
and on board her found an Englishman newly murdered.”82 In another encounter between 
the British Navy and the guarda costas, Captain Berkeley of the Windsor came across an 
English master and two other men in a canoe off the coast of Hispaniola. According to 
the English master, his vessel was seized by a guarda costa who kidnapped the three men 
in order to use them as pilots on a privateering cruise up the North American coast. The 
master claimed that the Spanish seamen of the guarda costa treated the rest of his crew
83with, “cruelties,” such as, “cutting off noses and arms in cold blood and wantonness.” 
While it remains doubtful that Patino ordered Spanish American officials to condone 
such bloodshed, the Spanish administration under his watch accomplished little by way 
of preventing it. The hysteria caused by such tales fed the pressure Patino needed to place 
on his British counterparts.
The Royal Navy and the Commercial Proxy War
The violence perpetrated by the guarda costas of Cartagena played well in 
Patino’s “diplomacy o f menace,” yet they were also responding to the threatening
82 South Carolina Gazette, March 11, 1731, no. 10; Harmon, Trade and Privateering in Spanish Florida , p. 
7.
83 Vernon to Duke of Newcastle and Sir Charles W ager (Draft) [Burford, at Port Royal, August 30, 1740] 
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presence of the British Royal Navy. A change in British policy in the early decades of 
the eighteenth century meant that, in many ways, Spanish America went from being 
under economic invasion to being in very real danger of an actual British siege. As 
Jamaican Governor Lawes realized in the first days of his tenure in office, interlopers 
were not the only British vessels plying contraband goods throughout Spanish America. 
The British Royal Navy entered into the illicit trade throughout the early decades of the 
eighteenth century, thereby actively pushing for the free trade, blue-water empire that 
their Whig party backers in London so desperately wanted.85 The image of seventy and 
eighty-gun navy vessels approaching Spanish American port cities to force trade 
complicates the usual narrative of easy trans-imperial economic relations on the 
periphery of empire.86 The threatening presence of the British Royal Navy in the waters 
around Cartagena gave heightened importance to the guarda costas as maritime 
defenders of Spanish American port cities.
Considering the threat of war and the loss of the asiento contract, the participation 
of the British Royal Navy in illicit trade must be understood within Britain’s larger 
political economy stretching back to the seventeenth century. In much the same way that 
the War of the Spanish Succession centralized Madrid’s authority over its hinterlands, 
England was also reshaped by its own republican experiment. Described by one scholar 
as, “an unqualified failure,” the reign o f Oliver Cromwell proved a boon to the fortunes 
of England as a maritime power and permanently altered the balance of power in the
X4 Lynch, Bourbon Spain, p. 136.
H5 For a more detailed discussion o f  this debate, see: Steve Pincus, “Rethinking Mercantilism: Political 
Economy, the British Empire, and the Atlantic W orld in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” in
William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 69, no. 1 (Jan. 2012): 3-34.
In much o f the historiography, frequency of smuggling and illicit trade is conflated with ease of 
conducting illicit transactions — a point which the violence surrounding illicit trade around Cartagena 
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Caribbean.87 In a political era epitomized by fear and aggression, naval strength became 
a psychological and strategic panacea for England during the middle decades of the 
seventeenth century.88 While building up forces on the island for protection against 
enemies, real and imagined, Cromwell developed an aggressive plan to developed 
footholds in the Spanish Caribbean from which to harass his Catholic foes. Cromwell 
expected his planned invasion of Jamaica to continue in the Elizabethan legacy of war 
‘beyond the line’ but his overtly aggressive policy destroyed amicable relations in the 
eyes of the Spanish. This hostility set the stage for eighteenth-century conflicts where 
belligerence in the Americas translated to widespread warfare on the European 
mainland.89 Cromwell’s fall eased relations between Spain and Britain but possession of 
Jamaica and a tradition of aggressive naval actions in the Americas remained a long- 
lasting legacy of the period.
While the return of the monarchy in Britain offered Spanish America a reprieve 
from the kinds of bellicose actions of the Cromwell regime, British planners still sought 
access to Spanish America’s wealthy resources. The eighteenth century became the era of 
contraband trade in the Americas as British merchants endeavored to more completely 
break through Spain’s trade monopoly. Yet, British politicians were divided over how 
best to tap into Spanish American trade wealth, a division which crossed the Atlantic and 
complicated relations between Britain and Spain over issues of trade. On the one hand, 
Tory planners developed the South Sea Company as the trading entity responsible for 
carrying out Britain’s asiento contract with Spanish America, thereby seeking access to
87 N.A.M. Rodger, The Command o f  the Ocean: A Naval History o f  Britain, 1649-1815 (W.W. Norton & 
Company, New York, NY 2004): 32.
88 Ibid., p. 32.
89A.P. Newton, The European Nations in the West Indies 1493-1688. (Adam & Charles Black, London, 
1933), p. 213.
30
trade through monopolizing the treaty concessions that Britain obtained through the War 
of the Spanish Succession.90 On the other hand, Whigs sought to “pry open Spanish 
American markets for British manufactures.”91 Jamaican interlopers carried out free-trade 
with Spanish America with the tacit approval of the Whigs, while agents for the South 
Sea Company railed against the competition with the Company’s monopoly privileges. 
Added to this milieu, the British Royal Navy, largely supported in Parliament by Whigs, 
aggressively defended Britain’s trade with Spanish America -  both licit and illicit.92
The issue of armed British vessels weighing anchor at Spanish American ports 
brought to the fore questions of imperial dominance and the very security o f Spain’s 
American possessions in ways that Jamaican interlopers never had. While the 1729 
Treaty of Seville proved a diplomatic success for Patino in gaining British support for the 
seizures of Tuscany and Parma, part of the treaty betrayed the heart of Spanish fears 
regarding armed British navy ships engaging in trade in the Americas. According to the 
treaty, Britain agreed to “prohibit and effectively bar under any pretext ships of war of his 
British Majesty from sheltering, escorting, or protecting the embarkations that commit 
illicit commerce on the coasts of the dominions o f his Catholic Majesty.” Yet, just as 
Patino used the threat of guarda costa violence for diplomatic gain despite promises 
made in the Treaty of Seville, the participation of the British Royal Navy in contraband 
trade supported the political will of the Whigs in Parliament despite their own promises 
to terminate the trade. For the Spanish, the British policy of forcing open trade in Spanish 
America with ships of the line as a wedge struck a deeper chord than the arrival of illicit
)0 For a more detailed discussion o f  Tory’s role in the formation o f the South Sea Company, see, Pincus, 
“Rethinking Mercantilism.”
91 Pincus, “Rethinking Mercantilism,” p. 27.
92 See, Rodger, The Command o f  the Ocean, pp. 178-185.
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bolts of Brittany linen or barrels of North American wheat. For Patino and Spanish 
American officials such as Mendinueta, the British Royal Navy turned the tables in the 
proxy war waging in the Caribbean.
The Royal Navy’s primary responsibility in American waters was to restore 
Britain’s maritime prestige which had suffered by the seizures o f British vessels by the 
guarda costas. For an empire which prided itself on the extent of its trade and naval 
power, Patino’s policy hurt the British where it counted the most by curtailing their 
freedom of navigation. According to an editorial in the London Magazine and reprinted 
throughout North America, “it is impossible that the British Commerce can be safe in any 
Part of the World where it can be interrupted by a Spanish Cruiser, or Guarda Costa,” 
because, as the commentator noted, the Spanish, “seize every English Ship they can make 
themselves Masters of.”94 The danger of guarda costa attack, moreover, extended beyond 
the British Empire’s merchant vessels. In one case off the coast of Cuba, the sloop 
Hannah and Lydia, captained by Edward Sunderland, was seized by a Puerto Rican 
guarda costa. Beyond taking the vessel and its valuables, the passengers aboard the sloop 
were reportedly beaten and abused at the hands of their Spanish captors.95 British subjects 
expressed their outrage at their curtailed liberties as some members of Parliament agitated 
for war.
Before the outbreak of the War of Jenkins’ Ear, however, both the Whigs and the 
British Navy faced constraints with how far they could push back on the Spanish 
empire.96 The diplomatic maneuvers that allowed Patino to promise to reign in the
94 South Carolina Gazette, Thursday, June 22, 1738, no. 230.
95 South Carolina Gazette, September 23, 1732, no. 36.
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guarda costas while simultaneously encouraging their actions paralleled the efforts of the 
British to maintain peace at the very edge of war. While the South Sea Company still 
held the asiento contract, and the British public remained heavily invested in the 
Company’s stock, outright war proved impracticable. Within such limitations, however, 
the British Royal Navy carved a niche in the smuggling trade to Spanish America by 
using force or the threat thereof for economic gain. For British imperial planners, the role 
of the Navy supported their commercial interests in the Americas. For Jamaican officials, 
however, the Navy’s extracurricular activities in the Caribbean left the port and the 
island’s merchants open to pirate and guarda costa attacks.
Perhaps just as prejudicial to Jamaica, however, was the competition offered by 
the Royal Navy to the island’s lucrative interloping trade. According to Governor Lord 
A. Hamilton, Jamaican merchants as early as 1712, “Complain of the discouragement of 
their trade, particularly of the most considerable and advantageous branch of it, that to the 
Spanish coast, through Commanders of H.M. ships of war having in great measure 
engrost it and carrying it on with the Queen’s ships.” Rather than argue that the Royal 
Navy’s extra-legal trade interfered with their ability to protect the island, Hamilton went 
on to argue that the ships of the Royal Navy engaged in commerce with Spanish 
America, “to the discouragement o f that of the merchants,” of Jamaica.97 Hamilton’s later 
successor, Governor Lawes, echoed a similar complaint about the Navy’s trading 
activities along with his protests about the state o f the island’s security. According to 
Lawes, the Royal Navy carried merchandise to Spanish America “which otherwise would 
be done by vessells belonging to the Island, and consequently be a livelihood to numbers 
of seafaring men, who now have not bread for want of employment, which is the chief
97 CSP 1712-1714, p. 123.
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occasion of so many o f them going a pyrating.”98 In Lawes’ calculations, not only did the 
Royal Navy neglect their duty to protect Jamaican shipping, but by cutting into the 
interloping trade, the Navy further harmed the island by forcing its unemployed seamen 
into piracy. Caught between the crosshairs of these competing commercial interests were 
the port cities of Spain’s American empire.
Similar to Patino’s manipulation o f the contraband trade for the good of Spanish 
imperial policy, the Royal Navy’s engagement in illicit trade served as a tool of empire 
which benefitted Kingston as much as London, despite complaints from Jamaican 
officials. Smuggling by the Royal Navy reflected a wider British political philosophy 
regarding free trade and open navigation o f the world’s oceans, a philosophy which 
Jamaican interlopers themselves embraced. The point was an old one, argued effectively 
by the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, that the Atlantic was a mare liberum despite Spain’s 
claims to dominion. According to Grotius, non-Iberian powers had no duty to respect 
Spain’s claim to a mare clausem Atlantic in which trade and possession remained in the 
hands of the “discoverers” in perpetuity. Taking Grotius’s seventeenth-century argument 
further, the British Empire of the eighteenth century wanted much more than just the 
ability to navigate the Atlantic, they wanted to right to ply their manufactured goods at 
any port in that mare liberum. "  The British Royal Navy brought the benefit of superior 
arms to force such trade on Spanish America, benefitting all British subjects with an 
interest in transimperial trade.
9SCSP, no. 272 (1717-18): 271.
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While the South Sea Company engaged in the asiento contract in the hope of 
amassing wealth through access to Spanish American ports, such desires were largely 
unattainable. The monopoly privileges of the Company also meant that Company traders 
ostensibly operated within the confines of the law, unable to engage in the more 
profitable free-trade of Jamaican interlopers.100 In response to these confines, British 
negotiators sought and received permission for a license vessel of first 500, later 1,000, 
tons to trade to Spanish America in synch with the annual Spanish trade fairs.101 In the 
long run, however, the Kingston interlopers would far eclipse the South Sea Company in 
supplying the Spanish Main with much-needed trade goods.102 The decline in the 
profitability of the asiento contract for the South Sea Company in the years before the 
outbreak o f the War o f Jenkins’ Ear coincided with a Whig-dominated political desire for 
free trade in the Americas. Violence perpetrated against British mariners further added to 
the calls for war against Spain, now seen worth the risk of losing the unprofitable asiento 
contract.
The goal of attaining free trade in the Americas at the expense of the Spanish 
monopoly was embraced by the Royal Navy’s leading commander in the Caribbean 
during the War of Jenkins’ Ear. Following his successful attack on Porto Bello in 
November of 1739, Vernon wrote back to Sir Charles Wager to extoll his 
accomplishment -  the opening of a Spanish American port to British trade. According to 
Vernon, Porto Bello served as one of, “the principal mart[s] for our merchants,” who 
exchanged manufactured goods for bullion in the years, “before the establishing a South
100 See: Curtis Nettels, “England and the Spanish-American Trade, 1680-1715,” Journal o f  Modern History 
.V o l. 3. No. 1 (Mar., 1931), pp. 1-32.
101 Nettels, “England and the Spanish-American Trade,” p. 31.
102 Palmer, Human Cargoes, pp. 158.
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Sea Company interrupted the private trade.” 103 A devotee to the notion of free trade, 
Vernon appeared little concerned with the damage that interloping caused the South Sea 
Company, despite the British Company’s monopoly on trade with Spanish America. 
Vernon considered his principal task in Porto Bello to, “lay a solid foundation of 
intercourse between our merchants and them, to recover so beneficial a trade to the 
nation,” which he was able to argue had been a “success under my protection.” 104 
Smuggling, rather than trading companies, embodied the Whig ideal upheld by men like 
Vernon. In such a philosophy, the nation grew strong through the trade of manufactured 
goods which were shipped by British vessels, thereby strengthening the Navy, and bought 
with foreign bullion, thereby accruing wealth while weakening the enemy. The South Sea 
Company, however, interrupted a flourishing trade in Porto Bello which Vernon stated 
that he could, “remember flourishing here above thirty years ago,” and that he was able to 
reassert by forcefully opening the port to interlopers.105
The popular celebrations which followed Vernon’s success at Porto Bello 
epitomized the wider British sense of entitlement to free trade in the Americas. While 
imperial planners in Britain recognized the truth in Lord Haversham’s argument that 
trade and naval strength “both together are the wealth, strength, security and glory of 
Britain,” the early decades o f the eighteenth century witnessed a popular enthusiasm for 
maritime dominance. Much of this attention stemmed from the vociferous outcry of 
merchants and their supporters in the press regarding guarda costa attacks. According to 
historian Kathleen Wilson, daily conversations in Britain revolved around trade and the
103 Vernon to Sir Charles W ager [Strafford , in Porto Bello Harbour, April 5, 1740] in B. McL. Ranft, ed.
The Vernon Papers (Navy Records Society, London, England 1958): 86.
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guarda costas as the people and Parliament agitated for revenge on the Spanish 
Empire.106 The lines, “Tame proud Iberia, shake ye Gallick throne,
Give freedom to the World, and keep her own,” from A Skit on Britain reflect such 
popular sentiment. For Londoners, the British press, and Navy, free trade in the Americas 
became an issue far more important than sheer economics.107 Rather, mare liberum in 
terms of navigation and trade came to symbolize the very freedom and survival of the 
British Empire. In this sense, Vernon fought for much more than just new markets for 
British manufactures during the War o f Jenkins’ Ear.
Despite the pomp and rhetoric about the importance of His Majesty’s navy and 
its very real role in defending British merchants from guarda costas harassment, men like 
Edward Vernon found themselves undersupplied for their American deployments. Just as 
Mendinueta received orders which he could not fulfill without engaging in foreign 
commerce, Vernon relied on smuggling and prize money to fill in the gaps in supply from 
his superiors. In one such instance, Vernon requested, “bay frocks and trousers as very 
proper for [the Caribbean] in the rainy seasons,” for his crew who experienced extreme 
cold on night watch without them. Despite repeated inquiries regarding the clothing, 
Vernon was only able to provide his men with the frocks and trousers by securing extra- 
naval money to outfit his crew. With an average five percent fee charged to smugglers for
convoying their vessels or their goods, securing the funds himself proved far easier than
108getting supplies through the regular channels.
106 Kathleen Wilson, The Sense o f  the People: Politics, Culture and Imperialism in England, 1715-1785 
(New York 1995): 50.
107 Ibid., p. 137.
I0X Rodger, The Command o f  the Ocean , p. 234.
37
While carrying extralegal goods defied the wishes of the Admiralty Board and 
opened British American ports up to foreign aggression, the trade was essential for the 
maintenance o f His Majesty’s ships in American waters. For Vernon, as for Mendinueta, 
one of the primary concerns was receiving enough food to keep his men at sea. The main 
ordinance store for the British Navy in the Caribbean was on the tropical island of 
Jamaica, which meant that the majority of the foodstuffs needed by the Navy arrived 
through North American trade channels. Yet, as Vernon complained to the Victualling 
Board, “I am greatly apprehensive if they depend on [North American trade], his 
Majesty’s Forces will run the hazard of starving here.” For, despite the bellicose language 
of British North American merchants who complained of guarda costa attacks, Vernon 
stated that those same merchants preferred to trade with possessions of the Spanish and 
French crowns because the merchants received, “their payments from them either in 
money, or commodities [and] they can get at lower prices.” 109 Some of the most basic 
needs of the British Royal Navy -  food and clothing -  were met by the contraband trade, 
despite clear regulations from the Admiralty Board prohibiting naval ships from carrying 
on such commerce.
For both Mendinueta and Vernon, providing adequately for their crews proved 
even more important considering the competition prevalent in the eighteenth-century 
Caribbean for competent seamen. Not only did men of the sea have their choice between 
interlopers, privateers, and merchantmen of their own empire, but the maritime world 
proved highly permeable between empires. As in the famous case of Edward Coxere, 
who served on Spanish, Dutch, British, and Turkish ships before being taken prisoner by
1<w Vernon to the Victualling Board (Draft) [Burford, at Sea, October 4, 1740] in Ranft, The Vernon Papers,
p. 361.
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the Spanish, imperial subjecthood mattered little in the open blue waters o f the world’s 
oceans.110 Even Vernon complained of the “shock one to think there can be wretches as 
abandon’d as even to desert the service of God, as well as the Crown and their country, 
by going over to the enemies of our holy religion,” during the early stages of the War of 
Jenkins’ Ear. For Vernon, these seamen’s, “ingratitude is the more shameless, as a 
principal view of this war, has been to secure our seamen from being prey to Spanish 
Guarda Costas.'1'1 And yet, instead of the prescribed capital punishment for such 
desertion, Vernon granted the recalcitrant seamen a general pardon if they returned to 
their British vessels.111 Vernon was not displaying uncharacteristic leniency by granting 
deserting sailors a pardon but, rather, a pragmatic outlook in response to the constant 
competition and wide market available to seamen.
While impressments filled the British Navy’s rosters, it remained up to individual 
commanders to keep those men when the ships weighed anchor at various ports. Perhaps 
for this reason, Captain Christopher O’Brien argued that, “It is [the captain’s] 
indispensible duty to see that the poor seamen be not wronged of his due, nor the service 
carried on by noise, stripes or blows,” and “not the ship made the prison of, but where the
i i ' j
service requires immediate and constant attendance.” “ For men like Vernon,
“immediate and constant attendance” was mandatory to retain enough men to put ships 
out each season. Despite the technical illegality of British Navy ships carrying 
contraband trade, the minor transgression meant that Vernon supplied his men and kept 
navy operations in the Caribbean running smoothly. While Vernon was a professed
110 Rodger, The Command o f  the Ocean, p. 61.
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advocate for free trade, what the Spanish deemed contraband trade, he was also as 
dependent on that trade as his Spanish counterpart at Cartagena. Both Vernon and 
Mendinueta competed for available seamen, thereby increasing their dependence on 
contraband trade in order to provide their maritime crews with supplies.
With the participation of the British Royal Navy in the contraband trade to 
Spanish America, violence in the years leading up to the War o f Jenkins’ Ear escalated 
out of control. While the guarda costa fleets sailed with instructions to disrupt British 
American shipping, they encountered more than just unarmed merchantmen. Nor were 
Spanish American settlements free from harassment by their British counterparts. In 
1715, the governor of Cuba complained to Governor Hamilton of Jamaica that several 
vessels had been fitted out from that island and that, “some o f them had landed near 
Havana and committed hostilities on the ships and dominions o f the King o f Spain.” 113 
Even Rear Admiral Charles Stewart admitted that many of the British seamen who 
complained about the depredations of the guarda costas were themselves guilty of illicit 
trade and barbarity in Spain’s American possessions.114 Perhaps the greatest danger for 
Spanish seamen seeking out British prizes came when they encountered not prizes, but 
vessels of the Royal Navy. Such was the case when Captain William Laws sailed the 
Drake through the Windward Passage on a voyage to London. En route, the vessel was, 
“attack’d by a Spanish Privateer, who took her for a Merchantman.” The mistake proved 
costly to the unfortunate guarda costa when the Drake returned fire and sunk the other 
ship, killing all those on board.115
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While British crews faced abuse, torture, and even death at the hands of guarda 
costas, some Spanish American seamen risked a fate worse than each of those. While 
many of the eighteenth-century’s seamen were mixed-race, men of African descent 
onboard guarda costas faced enslavement at the hands of their British captors. After a 
Spanish American seaman by the name of Juan Casado Valdes reported being imprisoned 
by a Jamaican privateer who attempted to sell him into slavery, the governor of Cuba, 
Alonso de Arcos Moreno, wrote the Council of the Indies. According to Moreno, the 
widespread British practice of enslaving mixed-race Spanish American seaman, “will be 
the cause of the end of [Spanish] privateering on these coasts, with the fear which has 
gripped the free blacks and mulattos o f falling into slavery.” 116 For those free seamen of 
mixed ancestry, encounters with British American mariners became struggles to maintain 
their freedom and avoid enslavement on British soil. As a waystation for the transatlantic 
slave trade, moreover, Jamaican markets sat poised to absorb men like Valdes. Such fears 
comingled with the general British hysteria over the barbarity of the guarda costas, 
sparking vicious battles when ships of the two empires encountered one another on the 
high seas.
The Siege of Cartagena
Violence over the political economy of smuggling in the Caribbean came to a 
head with the British invasion of Cartagena. The escalation of forces on either side of the 
Caribbean increased pressure on already strained sources of supply for both Vernon and 
Spanish Naval Admiral Bias de Lezo. In a letter from Lezo and intercepted by Vernon,
116 Marrero, Cuba: Economia y Sociedad, p. 35. Translation is my own.
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the Spanish commander demanded “a speedy supply of above three hundred thousand 
quintals o f beef, pork and dry provisions, and seventeen hundred barrels of flour,” from 
the French governor of Leogane, L ’Amage. The order indicated to Vernon that, “it is 
plain [Lezo] is greatly distressed for provisions.” 117 Yet, the free trade that Vernon and 
his supporters encouraged in the Caribbean before the outbreak of the war proved 
detrimental when the conflict got underway. For, even as Vernon celebrated Lezo’s lack 
of supplies, he published orders in North American newspapers commanding the 
cessation of the provisions trade to Spanish America. The New-York Weekly Journal, 
among others, approved o f the measure and printed, “The Prohibition for Exporting of 
Provisions, to any foreign Parts is well received among the People here, it being Judg’d a 
most effectual way of distressing our Enemies who are in great Want thereof, and without 
which their Fleets will be unable to put to Sea.” 118 Despite the seemingly unanimous 
agreement with Vernon’s order, however, Cartagena stocked its garrisons in anticipation 
of the siege with provisions from British American interlopers.119
In hindsight, the siege of Cartagena appears an odd choice for a major British 
Navy operation. Within the larger political economy of the Spanish Empire, the port city 
of Cartagena proved important because it possessed a very secure harbor for anchoring 
the treasure fleets. British imperial planners were familiar with the formidable geography 
and architecture of Cartagena both because of previous naval operations and the fact that 
Cartagena served as a base for the South Sea Company. The success of Cartagena’s 
guarda costas pointed to a more vigorous imperial presence in the region and should
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have given Vernon and his superiors second thoughts about their proposed invasion. Yet, 
just as eighteenth-century observers lamented the supposed venality of Spanish American 
contraband trade, many only saw decay when they looked at Cartagena. Assumptions of 
corruption, vice, and disloyalty among Spanish American officials, “portend\<zd] a fatal 
revolution,” in the years leading up to Vernon’s amphibious assault, leading British 
troops to rush headlong into a foolhardy mission on the Spanish M ain.120
Despite Vernon’s numerical superiority and Cartagena’s supposed weakness, the 
invasion proved to be an unmitigated failure for the British. The troops and fleet arranged 
to rendezvous on the island of Jamaica before proceeding on to the assault of Cartagena. 
For many of the troops, however, their hiatus in Jamaica proved disastrous and many 
succumbed to fever or sickened themselves on the island’s plentiful supply of rum .121 The 
disease environment of tropical Cartagena was no improvement over that of Jamaica and 
was compounded by the mismanagement of such a large force on the part of Vernon and 
Brigadier General Thomas Wentworth. Perhaps more damaging to Vernon’s assault, 
however, was the robust and brilliant defense put up by the city’s soldiers and 
inhabitants. Focusing their forces on the defense of St. Lazar, the Spanish defenders of 
Cartagena sunk their own ships in the harbor to keep Vernon from positioning his ships 
close enough to provide cover for British ground forces. The British were further lulled 
into complacency regarding the invasion when they handily took Boca Chica Castle and
1 9 9St. Joseph’s Fort, finding, “only three drunken Spaniards,” at the latter. “  The same 
would not be true of St. Lazar. There, rather than fleeing to the British banner,
120 John Lynch, Bourbon Spain: 1700-1808 (Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass. 1989): 59.
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Cartagena’s defenders fought their last stand to repulse the invaders. Too late to save the 
lives of hundreds of invaders, Vernon would come to understand where the residents of 
Cartagena’s loyalties lay.
Yet, Vernon’s painful lesson seems lost in much of the scholarship on contraband 
trade and the War o f Jenkins’ Ear. Throughout the eighteenth century, as argued by 
scholar Richard Pares, Spanish American officials in places like Cartagena used the 
excuse of British violence to explain the rampant contraband trade in their dominions.
For historians looking in, commercial violence proved little more than, “expiatory ritual,” 
to mask complicity and venality from metropolitan eyes.123 Without a doubt, some 
Spanish American officials covered their own participation in the smuggling for personal 
profit.124 However, sweeping condemnation of men like Mendinueta distorts the wider 
Spanish political economy in which they were forced to operate. Moreover, seeing 
violence as a mere pretext for illicit trade brushes aside the very real bloodshed which 
became normative in the early decades of the eighteenth century. Worse, blindness to the 
ways in which illicit or extralegal trade was used by Spanish imperial actors has led to a 
misinterpretation, both then and now, of the siege of Cartagena and the port’s successful 
defense.
Violent encounters between guar da costas and British American seamen in the 
circum-Caribbean illuminate the ways in which contraband trade served as a tool of 
Britain and Spain’s trans-imperial political economy. Rather than seeing illicit trade 
between subjects of disparate empires as a clandestine but unavoidable evil, the
123 Richard Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-1763 (London 1963): 6.
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Escribanfa de Camara 1194, Sentencias del Consejo, Sentencia de Jorge de Villalonga, Virrey de Santa Fe, 
1730.
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smuggling activities of Mendinueta and Vernon point to the ways in which illegal inter­
imperial trade could serve the purposes of metropolitan planners. Mendinueta supplied 
the guarda costas with illicit wheat in order to defend the strategically important port of 
Cartagena. Furthermore, Mendinueta’s guarda costas accomplished the broader task of 
harassing British shipping which allowed Patino to successfully push his patron’s Italian 
designs at the negotiating table. The British Royal Navy entered the Atlantic in part as a 
response to guarda costa harassment of British shipping. Yet, naval commanders like 
Vernon remained too undersupplied to maintain well-fed and, even more importantly, 
well-paid crews in the competitive eighteenth-century maritime world. Carrying 
contraband trade in vessels of his royal Majesty bridged supply gaps and moved forward 
British free-trade designs in Spanish American port cities. Rather than venal officials 
operating for their personal enrichment, both Mendinueta and Vernon utilized the 
contraband trade as an instrument of empire while simultaneously producing the need for 
more smuggling and eventual conflict.
The War o f Jenkins’ Ear ended Britain’s possession of the asiento contract and 
led to the financial collapse of the South Sea Company, bringing about an economic and 
political scandal that reverberated throughout Britain. The conflict was subsumed in the 
near-global outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession that waged for another 
decade. Despite war and in the return of peace, Cartagena remained reliant on trans­
imperial trade connections from throughout the Caribbean basin. The commercial ties 
between Cartagena and Jamaica continued in the later decades of the eighteenth century, 
slowing only when the American Revolution cut Jamaica off from its former supply of 
foodstuffs and as the island’s sugar production eclipsed all other economic activity in the
45
wake of the Haitian Revolution. The world of Caribbean contraband trade cannot be 
easily separated from the political machinations of imperial planners. Illicit economic 
relations could and were used in order to enact violence upon or wage war against the 
very sources of those supplies. War and violence in the eighteenth-century Caribbean 
meshed imperceptibly with illicit commerce and smuggling. As Vernon discovered, 
smuggling and imperial loyalty coexisted without contradiction on the peripheries of 
empire.
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